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Negotiation, Ratification and Implementation of the CRPD and its Status in the EU Legal Order 
Merijn Chamon 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following ratification by Ireland in 2018, all of the EU Member States have now ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Twenty-two Member States (including 
the United Kingdom) have also ratified the CRPD’s Optional Protocol (OP-CRPD). The EU itself 
acceded to the Convention in December 2010, but it has not ratified the OP-CRPD to date. The CRPD 
was the very first human rights convention to which the EU has acceded.1 Given the EU’s complex 
internal division of competences, the EU and its Member States have acceded to the CRPD jointly. For 
this reason, the CRPD is a so-called ‘mixed’  agreement, in EU law terms. The EU’s accession to the 
CRPD concurrently to the Member States raises a number of important legal questions, notably in 
relation to the precise competence pursuant to which the EU has acceded to the Convention (which also 
explains why the EU has not acceded to the OP-CRPD), and the extent to which it has exercised its 
competence (which concomitantly, determines the degree of exercise of competence by the Member 
States). Moreover, questions have arisen about the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of 
the EU (CJEU) to interpret the CRPD.  
This chapter is divided into 5 further sections. Section II will briefly point out the characteristics of 
mixed agreements in EU law, following which section III will discuss the reasons for the CRPD being 
a mixed agreement and the repercussions this has had for the negotiation, ratification and 
implementation of the agreement. Section IV then generally looks into the EU law obligations that flow 
from (mixed agreements) and that are imposed on EU Member States. Section V applies this to the 
CRPD while section VI concludes. 
II. MIXED AGREEMENTS IN EU LAW 
Before discussing the mixed nature of the CPRD itself, it is necessary to briefly introduce the concept 
of a ‘mixed agreement’ in EU law. In light of this, the specificities of the CPRD itself will be presented 
in section 3 below. 
 
 
1 Sacha   Prechal, ‘The   European   Union’s   accession   to   the   Istanbul   Convention’   in   Koen   Lenaerts,  
Jean-Claude  Bonichot,  Heikki  Kanninen,  Caroline  Naômé  and  Pekka  Pohjankoski  (eds),  An  Ever-Changing  
Union?  Perspectives  on  the  Future  of  EU  Law  in  Honour  of  Allan  Rosas  (Hart  Publishing 2019) 279–92 
Chapter published in Delia Ferri & Andrea Broderick (eds), Research Handbook on EU Disability 
Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2020, pp. 52-70. 
53 
 
The EU has been termed an ‘open federation’, in the sense that both the EU and its Member States may 
act simultaneously in the external sphere.2 EU external competences are largely parallel, or 
complementary, as Dashwood and Heliskoski would say,3 to the EU’s internal competence. This is 
reflected in Article 216(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which, inter 
alia, provides that the EU has external competence when this is ‘necessary to achieve […] one of the 
objectives referred to in the Treaties’. As a result, the EU has not been vested with plenary treaty-making 
power.4 This constitutional setup has provided the conditions for the practice of ‘mixity’ to flourish in 
the EU’s external relations. Mixed agreements are international agreements concluded by both the EU 
and (some or all of) the EU Member States, on the one hand, and one (or more) subject(s) of international 
law, on the other hand.5 
In light of this, the question arises as to when an international agreement will be concluded in the form 
of such a mixed agreement on the part of the EU and its Member States, and when it will be concluded 
by the EU on its own.6 Until very recently, the position defended by most EU Member States was that 
the EU could only act on its own when such an agreement came wholly within the EU’s exclusive 
competences, as foreseen in Article 3 TFEU.7 Since the default category of EU competence is that of 
shared (concurrent) competence,8 mixed agreements would then constitute the rule, an agreement by the 
EU itself being possible only when it can be shown (typically by the EU Commission) that the EU has 
exclusive competence with regard to every element covered by the agreement.9 However, in a recent 
judgment, however, the Court has confirmed that it is possible for the EU to act alone, externally, 
pursuant to a merely shared (concurrent) competence.10 This, of course, complicates matters because the 
EU does not necessarily have to exercise the shared competences that it possesses: if the EU  
 
2  Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (Cambridge University Press 2014), 
p. 173. 
3  Alan Dashwood and Joni Heliskoski, ‘The Classic Authorities Revisited’ in Alan Dashwood and Christophe 
Hillion (eds.), The General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 1, pp.12-13. 
4  Schütze, supra note 2, 195-196.  This is different from other ‘federal’ polities – in that regard, see the comparative 
analysis by Joseph Weiler, ‘The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle’ 
in David O'Keeffe and Henry Schermers (eds.), Mixed agreements (Kluwer 1983) 35, pp. 35-83. 
5  Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Handlungsformen und Steuerungsressourcen in den EU-Außenbeziehungen’ in Armin Hatje 
and Peter-Christian Müller-Graf (eds.), Europäische Außenbeziehungen (Nomos 2014) 207, p. 227. 
6 Note, however, that even in the latter case, Article 216 TFEU provides that ‘[a]greements concluded by the Union 
are binding upon […] its Member States’ 
7 The argument proposed by the Hungarian government in relation to the Marrakesh Treaty is a typical example 
of this. In that regard, see Opinion of AG Wahl in Opinion procedure 1/13 on the Marrakesh Treaty 
EU:C:2016:657, paras. 118-119. 
8 Article 4(1) TFEU. 
9 Given the limited number of areas in which the EU has a priori exclusive competence (see Article 3(1) TFEU), 
the question will typically be whether the agreement comes under one of the scenarios foreseen in Article 3(2) 
TFEU (which codifies the notion of implied exclusive competence). On this point, the Court’s established case 
law provides that ‘[i]n accordance with the principle of conferral as laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) TEU, it is, 
[…] for the party concerned to provide evidence to establish the exclusive nature of the external competence of 
the EU on which it seeks to rely’. See e.g. Case C-114/12 Commission/Council EU:C:2014:2151, para. 75. 
10 Case C-600/14 Germany/Council EU:C:2017:935, paras. 50-51. 
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Council decides not to exercise an EU shared competence, it leaves the necessary legal scope for the Member 
States to exercise their (shared) competence. As the law currently stands, the Council’s choice in this respect 
is entirely discretionary.11 Mixity, then, is ‘facultative’ if shared competences are at issue (regardless of 
whether these are combined with EU or Member State exclusive competences), whereas it is obligatory if an 
agreement covers matters within the exclusive competences of both the EU and the Member States.12 
If an agreement is concluded as a mixed agreement rather than an EU-only agreement, a number of practical 
problems (with legal ramifications) are created in terms of the implementation of the agreement, the 
representation of the EU/its Member States in the bodies set up by the agreement, as well as in relation to the 
international responsibility of the EU/its Member States for the commitments entered into through the 
conclusion of the agreement. In Opinion 1/94 relating to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, 
the Commission had therefore tried to convince the Court to rule in favour of concluding the WTO 
agreements as EU-only agreements, despite the underlying competences being shared.13 However, the Court 
dismissed arguments based on the practical difficulties related to ‘mixity’, effectively confirming that EU-
only agreements are only legally required in so far as the agreements come under EU exclusive competence, 
confirming the position that if shared competences are at issue (and in so far as the ERTA doctrine does not 
apply), it is entirely up to the Council to decide whether or not to make use of these EU competences.14 The 
Court, in Opinion 1/94, was not oblivious to the ‘practical difficulties’ invoked by the Commission, but its 
ruling on those difficulties was rather succinct. In situations of mixed action and the overcome practical 
difficulties, there is, according to the Court, an obligation incumbent on the EU and the Member States to 
ensure close cooperation, flowing from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Union.15 
In the subsequent FAO case, the Court found that internal arrangements, such as inter-institutional 
agreements concluded between the institutions, are concrete means by which to put this duty of close 
cooperation, ensuring unity in the international representation of the Union, into effect.16 As the law stands, 
there is no obligation flowing from the requirement of unity to conclude such internal arrangements so as to 
ensure the proper implementation of mixed agreements, but FAO does make clear that if such arrangements 
have been concluded, they may be binding and, therefore, enforceable against the EU institutions (and the 
Member States). 
 
11 For a discussion of the possibilities to somehow qualify this unfettered political choice, see Merijn Chamon, 
‘Constitutional Limits to the Political Choice for Mixity’ in Eleftheria Neframi and Mauro Gatti (eds.), 
Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law (Nomos 2018) 137, pp. 137-166. 
12 Allan Rosas, ‘Mixity Past, Present and Future: Some Observations’ in Merijn Chamon & Inge Govaere (eds.), 
EU External Relations Post-Lisbon: The Law and Practice of Facultative Mixity (Martinus Nijhoff Brill 2020) 8-
18. 
13 Opinion 1/94 on the WTO Agreements EU:C:1994:384, para. 106. 
14 Ibid. para. 107. 
15 Ibid. para. 108. 
16 Case C-25/94 Commission/Council EU:C:1996:114, para. 49.  
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III. THE CRPD: A CASE OF OBLIGATORY MIXITY 
Given that mixity may either be facultative or obligatory, it is useful to analyse the different provisions 
of the CRPD to determine whether they are all covered by either shared, supporting or exclusive EU 
competences. If they are, there is, in principle, an option for the Council to conclude the CRPD on behalf 
of the EU on its own, with the CRPD then becoming binding for the Member States by virtue of EU 
law. If, however, at least one provision of the CRPD comes under exclusive national competence, mixity 
becomes obligatory (given that there are also exclusive EU competences involved). 
Although addressing the competence question requires a close and detailed analysis of the international 
agreement in question, it would appear at first sight that the CRPD is largely covered by the EU’s 
supporting, shared and exclusive competences.17 At the same time however, some CRPD obligations 
arguably come under the exclusive competence of the Member States, requiring their involvement and, 
thus, making mixity obligatory. Some of the CRPD provisions which may be noted in this regard are 
Article 18 CRPD, which deals, inter alia, with the question of nationality and registration at birth,18 
Article 12 CRPD on legal capacity, and Article 23 CRPD, which  affirms  the right to marriage.19 Since 
one such element of exclusive national competence is enough to turn the whole agreement into an 
obligatory mixed agreement, it appears that the CRPD represents a case of obligatory mixity.20 Even 
regardless of these elements, however, concluding the CRPD as a mixed agreement rather than an EU-
only agreement would appear preferable, given the broad scope and the far-reaching objectives of the 
Convention. Under the subsidiarity principle,21 the Member States seem to be better placed than the EU 
to pursue several of the commitments enshrined in the CRPD. 
 
17 The supporting competences at issue are, notably: culture and education (Article 6 TFEU); relevant shared 
competences (cf. Article 4 TFEU) are, notably: social policy, research and development, internal market, etc. In 
addition, given that a series of CRPD provisions affect common rules adopted by the EU institutions (such as the 
Employment Equality Directive) the EU also has a supervening exclusive competence for part of the CRPD. 
18 Confirming the acquisition of nationality as a national (exclusive) competence (which, nonetheless, has to be 
exercised in respect of EU law). In that regard, see, among others, Case C-221/17 Tjebbes EU:C:2019:189, para. 
30. 
19 See Case C-673/16 Coman EU:C:2018:38, para. 37. 
20 See Chamon, supra n 11, p. 141. 
21 On the relevance of this principle for the EU’s external relations, see, among others, Isabelle Bosse-Platière, 
‘L'application du principe de subsidiarité dans le cadre de l'action extérieure de l'Union européenne’ in Eleftheria 
Neframi and Mauro Gatti (eds.) Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law (Nomos 2018) 111, pp. 111-
136; Geert De Baere, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle Governing the use of EU External Competences’ in 
Marise Cremona (ed.) Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2018) 93, pp. 93-115; 
Isabelle Bosse-Platière and Marise Cremona, ‘Facultative Mixity in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity’ in 
Merijn Chamon and Inge Govaere (eds.), EU External Relations Post-Lisbon: The Law and Practice of Facultative 
Mixity (Martinus Nijhoff Brill 2020) 48-85. 
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I. Negotiation, Ratification and Implementation of the CRPD 
In 2004, the Council, pursuant to current Article 218(3) TFEU, authorized the Commission to negotiate 
the CRPD on behalf of the EU.22 On foot of a proposal of the Commission, the Council subsequently 
authorized the signature of the CRPD on behalf of the EU in accordance with current Article 218(5) 
TFEU.23  
As with any act of the Union, the decision authorizing the signature needs to identify a legal basis in the 
EU Treaties which confers the necessary competences on the Union to act.24 In 2007, both the 
Commission, in its proposal, and the Council, in its decision, were in agreement on the legal basis, 
identifying the internal market legal basis (Article 114 TFEU) and Article 19 TFEU on non-
discrimination, inter alia, on the ground of disability.25 However, when the final decision on the 
conclusion of the CRPD was proposed by the Commission, it added further legal bases. Apart from the 
two Treaty provisions relied upon for signature of the CRPD, the Commission also proposed to rely on 
Articles 31 (Common Customs Tariff), 53(1) and 62 (mutual recognition of qualifications), 91(1) and 
100(2) (transport), 109 (State Aid), 113 (tax matters) and 338 TFEU (statistics).26 The Council decision 
on the conclusion of the CRPD only refers to Articles 19 and 114 TFEU,27 however, which may be seen 
as an attempt to limit the scope of the commitments entered into by the EU.28 As noted above, most of 
the CRPD provisions would seem to come under the EU’s supporting, shared and exclusive 
competences, but the identification of only Articles 19 and 114 TFEU as legal bases suggests that the 
EU is not exercising its supporting and shared competences to the fullest. Unless the view is taken that 
the EU has exercised these competences to the fullest but that issues such as transport, statistics, etc. are 
ancillary,29 the choice of legal basis suggests that the EU only acts in relation to the CRPD’s provisions 
that aim to ensure the equal  
 
22 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol’ COM (2007) 
77 final, p. 2. 
23 See Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Doc. 7661/07. 
24 Emphasizing the constitutional significance of the choice of legal basis, see Opinion 2/00 on the Cartagena 
Protocol EU:C:2001:664, para. 5. 
25 See Commission, supra n 22;l; Draft Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Doc. 7401/1/07. 
26 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities - Proposal for a Council Decision 
concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the Optional Protocol to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ COM (2008) 530 final. 
27 See Council Decision (EC) 2010/48 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2010] OJ L 23/35. The Commission made a 
reservation to the Council’s choice of legal basis. In that regard, see Council of the European Union, 25 November 
2009, Doc. 15533/09 ADD 1. 
28 For a similar issue in relation to the Istanbul Convention, see Prechal, supra fn 1. 
29 However for the Commission this would be difficult to argue since it included these legal bases in its proposal, 
suggesting that at that time, the Commission did not consider the relevant provisions to be ancillary. 
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treatment of people with disabilities in matters related to the internal market. Indeed, when Ireland in 
the Mox Plant case argued that the EU had only acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Seas (UNCLOS) in relation to the latter’s provisions on fisheries but not in relation to the 
environmental provision, the Court noted that the Council’s Decision approving the EU accession to 
UNCLOS was inter alia based on the current Article 192 TFEU, suggesting that the EU had also 
exercised its competence in environmental matters.30 The EU’s Declaration of Competence in relation 
to the CRPD as finally decided upon by the Council (cf. infra), which significantly differs from the one 
proposed by the Commission,31 can  at first also be read in this light. This since it provides that ‘when 
Community rules exist but are not affected [by the provisions of the CRPD], in particular in cases of 
Community provisions establishing only minimum standards, the Member States have competence, 
without prejudice to the competence of the European Community to act in this field.’ While this 
provision may be read as indicating that the EU has only exercised its exclusive competences, the Court, 
again in Mox Plant interpreted an identical provision in the EU’s Declaration of Competence for the 
UNCLOS as a confirmation of the EU having exercised also its shared competences.32  
Similar to the Council’s approach to the Istanbul Convention discussed by Prechal, the above ‘suggests 
that the Council, having rejected the broad approach of the Commission, prefers a screening of the 
Convention, provision by provision, in order to establish the nature of the respective competences.’33 As 
a result, for those provisions of the CRPD coming under shared competence that are not covered by 
Article 19 and 114 TFEU, the EU Member States would only be bound under international law and the 
EU’s enforcement mechanisms could not be relied upon to ensure the Member States’ compliance with 
those provisions. 
The Commission had also proposed that the EU (sign and) accede to the OP-CRPD.34 Since Article 
19(1) TFEU iuncto Article 218(8) TFEU prescribe unanimity-voting in the Council, every single 
Member State has a veto on the accession of the EU to the OP-CRPD. To date,  at least three Member 
States have objected to the EU signing and acceding to it.35 Not coincidentally, there are also three EU 
Member States that have not signed the OP-CRPD in their individual capacity at the moment of writing: 
the Netherlands, Ireland and Poland.36 This may be surprising given that the Committee  
 
30 Case C-459/03 Commission/Ireland EU:C:2006:345, para. 97. 
31 Compare Annex 2 of Commission, supra n 26 with Annex II of Council Decision (EC) 2010/48 supra n 27. 
32 See infra section IV.ii. 
33 Xxx, supra n 1, p. x. 
34 See Commission, supra n 26 . 
35 See Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Doc. 7401/1/07 REV 
1, p. 2. It may be noted that, in their individual capacity, Ireland, Poland and The Netherlands have not signed the 
Optional Protocol. 
36 In addition, Bulgaria, Czechia and Romania have signed but not ratified the protocol. All the other EU Member 
States are Parties to the Optional Protocol. 
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established pursuant to the OP-CRPD may only issue non-binding recommendations but at least for the 
Netherlands and Ireland it seems these countries postpone accession to the OP-CRPD until they have fully 
implemented the CRPD itself.37 In addition, the Dutch recalcitrance to accede seems inspired by past 
experience. Non-binding recommendations adopted pursuant to agreements similar to the OP-CRPD have 
apparently been relied upon by Dutch judges in legal proceedings.38 
In terms of content, the Council’s decision on accession to the CRPD foresees that the Commission, Council 
and the Member States must agree on a code of conduct, spelling out the arrangements for the detailed 
functioning of the focal points (provided for in Article 33 CRPD)39 and for the representation and voting by 
the EU and the Member States in the bodies set up by the CRPD.40 The Code of Conduct was adopted in 
2010, specifically for the coordination of EU and Member State action under the CRPD, and it therefore 
applies instead of the general arrangements for EU Statements in multilateral organisations.41 The approach 
underlying both the general arrangements and the Code of Conduct is the same, however, and is premised on 
the identification of the precise competence that exists for every issue on the agenda, in order to determine 
who will act at the international level.42 While the language used in the Code of Conduct could be read as 
implying that it largely is a non-binding document,43 it should be noted that it actually resembles closely the 
language used in the FAO Arrangements that the Court held to be binding in FAO.  This means that the 
coordination mechanisms foreseen in the Code could possibly be enforced vis-à-vis the Member States in 
order to ensure ‘the effectiveness of the international action of the European Union, as well as its credibility 
and reputation on the international stage.’44 
On the whole, the Code sets out the arrangements for the preparation of, and participation in, meetings of the 
bodies created by the CRPD and lays down the details of the focal points’ functioning.45 It subsequently 
makes clear that the division of tasks between the EU institutions and the Member States is ‘based on 
competence’. As noted above, three main  
 
 
37 See reply of the Minister of State at the Department of Justice and Equality on 2 April 2019 to the Question of  
Róisín Shortall on the CRPD; A similar issue in Poland is apparent from the Reply of the Undersecretary of State 
to interpellation No. 5217 on the possible ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, see < http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ6.nsf/main/5F8F7E7E>. 
38 See Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (V) voor het jaar 2019, Eerste 
Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2018–2019, 35 000 V, D, pp. 1-3. 
39 On the implementation of Article 33 CRPD, see Hoefmans, ‘The EU Framework for Monitoring the CRPD’, in 
this volume. 
40 See Articles 3 to 4 of Council Decision 2010/48. 
41 See Council of the European Union, EU Statements in multilateral organisations – General Arrangements Doc. 
15901/11. 
42 See also the critique on this by Wessel and Van Vooren, n 46. 
43 Notably, on the predominant use of the term ‘will’ rather than ‘shall’, see Legal Directorate of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Treaties and MOUs – Guidance on Practice and Procedures, March 2014, p. 15. 
44 See Case C-620/16 Commission/Germany EU:C:2019:256, para. 98. 
45 See Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct setting out internal arrangements for the implementation 
by and representation of the EU to the CRPD, 29 November 2010, Doc. 16243/10, para. 1. 
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competence-categories can be distinguished, and the Code of Conduct prescribes a different modus operandi 
for each of those: 
Nature of the Competence Modus Operandi 
MS competence MS will aim at elaborating coordinated positions 
whenever it is deemed appropriate 
Exclusive EU competence EU will aim at elaborating Union positions 
Shared and supporting and/or supplementing 
competence 
MS and EU will aim at elaborating common 
positions 
The Code of Conduct therefore distinguishes between (i) coordinated, (ii) Union and (iii) common positions. 
In terms of procedure, it provides that each of the three types of positions should be duly coordinated (in 
urgent cases possibly through electronic means) within the relevant Council working group, and at the 
initiative of either the (rotating) Presidency or at the request of the Commission or (one of) the Member 
States. Draft statements on coordinated positions are prepared by the Presidency, while Union and common 
positions are drafted by the Commission. At the meetings concerned, coordinated positions will be expressed 
by the Presidency or by a Member State appointed by the Presidency or by the Commission, provided that 
all Member States present agree. Union positions, on the other hand, are expressed by the Commission. When 
competences are inextricably linked, common positions will be expressed ‘on behalf of the Union and its 
Member States’, either by the Commission or the Presidency (or a Member State). Which of the two will act 
thereby depends on the preponderance of the matter concerned (falling within either EU or Member State 
competence).  The fact that arrangements, such as those included in the Code of Conduct, focus on the 
competence rather than on the policy question at issue has been criticized by Wessel and Van Vooren.46 This 
because it leads to protracted internal discussions (between EU institutions and Member States) on 
competence questions which are immaterial to the other Parties to the CRPD. Rather than focusing on the 
substance of the position to be adopted by the EU (and its Member States), the EU actors devote considerable 
energy to the formalistic question of competence. While the critique by Wessel and Van Vooren is pertinent, 
in the current state of EU integration, the Member States’ sensitivities on EU competence creep appear to be 
inevitable and a focus on competence unavoidable.  
ii. The CPRD’s Regional Economic Integration Organisation Clause 
So far, the issue of mixity has been discussed solely from an EU perspective. Of course, this is only part of 
the tale. Since the conferral of competences on the EU is ‘imperfect’, i.e. that principle may be binding on 
the EU and its Member States, but it cannot be enforced against third countries,47 international law will have 
to accommodate the EU’s peculiarities, in order  
 
46 See Ramses Wessel and Bart Van Vooren, ‘The EEAS's diplomatic dreams and the reality of European and 
international law’ (2013) Journal of European Public Policy 1350, 1353-1354. 
47 See Inge Govaere, ‘Functional and Facultative Mixity in the Light of the Principle of Partial and Imperfect 
Conferral’ in Merijn Chamon & Inge Govaere (eds.), EU External Relations Post-Lisbon: The Law and Practice 
of Facultative Mixity (Martinus Nijhoff Brill 2020) 23-47. 
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for the EU and its Member States to be able to conclude agreements as mixed agreements. In the case of the 
CRPD, as with many multilateral conventions, this has been done through the inclusion of a regional 
integration organization (RIO) clause, which is included in Article 44 CRPD. That provision reads as follows:  
1. “Regional integration organization” shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign 
States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of 
matters governed by the present Convention. Such organizations shall declare, in their 
instruments of formal confirmation or accession, the extent of their competence with respect to 
matters governed by the present Convention. Subsequently, they shall inform the depositary of 
any substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
2. References to “States Parties” in the present Convention shall apply to such organizations 
within the limits of their competence. 
3. For the purposes of article 45, paragraph 1, and article 47, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the present 
Convention, any instrument deposited by a regional integration organization shall not be 
counted. 
4. Regional integration organizations, in matters within their competence, may exercise their 
right to vote in the Conference of States Parties, with a number of votes equal to the number of 
their member States that are Parties to the present Convention. Such an organization shall not 
exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.  
 
The RIO clause in the CRPD contains a number of typical elements which are also to be found in RIO clauses 
contained in other conventions. In short, other Parties accept the special position of the EU and allow it to 
accede to the Convention jointly with its Member States, but not without securing a number of guarantees in 
terms of the international responsibility of the EU and in terms of voting rights. With regard to the CRPD, 
Article 44 provides that any international organization acceding to it must firstly make a declaration of 
competence, indicating in which areas and to which extent it has been conferred powers by its member states. 
In theory, such a declaration is critically important for the other Parties to the CRPD, in order to be able to 
determine which Party on the EU side may be held responsible for the commitments entered into under the 
CRPD. The CJEU itself has held that in absence of a declaration of competence, the EU and the Member 
States are jointly responsible for fulfilling the obligations under a mixed agreement.48 For third States, it is, 
of course, more interesting to be able to hold both the Member States and the EU jointly and severally liable.49 
In practice, however, the declarations of competence which the EU attaches to its instruments of ratification 
are of limited value to the other Parties to the Convention because of their lack of clarity.50 Should any dispute 
arise, the precise delimitation of commitments and responsibility would then have to be communicated by 
the EU and the EU Member States, without a guarantee that this would be accepted as the basis upon which 
to solve the dispute.51 The declarations of competence  
 
48 See Case C-316/91 Parliament/Council EU:C:1994:76, paras 24-35. See also Pieter-Jan Kuijper, ‘International 
Responsibility for EU Mixed Agreements’ in Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (ed.), Mixed Agreements 
Revisited (Hart Publishing 2010) 208, 209-210. 
49 Ibid. p. 224. 
50 See Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, ‘EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful 
Reference Base?’ (2012) European Foreign Affairs Review 491, 491-509. 
51 Yet the RIO clause, declaration of competence and the interpretation thereof by the EU and its Member States 
could constitute a special rule of international law in the sense of Article 64 of the Articles on the Responsibility 
of International Organizations (ARIO). See also Kuijper, supra n 48, 222-223. 
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themselves are unhelpful because they typically do not set out the EU’s competence in respect of particular 
CRPD provisions. Instead, they both describe the EU’s competences in general terms and provide a list of 
relevant EU secondary legislation. The latter list is of crucial importance since, pursuant to the ERTA 
doctrine, the EU acquires an exclusive external competence to enter into international agreements in so far 
as those agreements ‘affect’ secondary EU legislation. However, the application of this doctrine is a matter 
of eternal contestation, even between EU Member States and institutions.52 Therefore, third countries cannot 
be said to be properly informed of the extent of the EU’s competence as a result of the EU providing a list of 
legislation and informing the other Parties of the existence of the ERTA doctrine. 
Unlike the RIO clauses in some other multilateral agreements, the clause contained in the CRPD does not 
explicitly put forward a condition that at least one of the international organization’s State members (in casu 
EU Member States) should be Party to the CRPD before the international organization itself can accede to it. 
In light of the AMP Antarctique case,53 this point may be of broader relevance. In that case, the Court 
suggested that the EU could not play an autonomous role in the implementation of the Canberra Convention,54 
because its accession to the Convention (pursuant to the latter’s RIO clause) was predicated on at least one 
EU Member State being Party to the Convention. Although this finding was, in itself, rather questionable,55 
it could still mean, a contrario, that the EU, under EU law itself, can act completely autonomously from its 
Member States within the CRPD framework, e.g. by having the Commission alone (without the Member 
States) present common or Union positions on the CRPD. 
Finally, and as Article 44(4) CRPD makes clear, an organization such as the EU may become a Party to the 
CRPD, but this cannot result in it acquiring more voting rights than its Member States would otherwise have.  
IV. REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CRPD’S MIXED NATURE FOR THE EU LAW OBLIGATIONS OF 
MEMBER STATES 
In the seminal Haegeman case, the Court ruled that agreements concluded by the Council on behalf of the 
EU form an integral part of EU law, from the date of their entry into force.56 Article 216(2) TFEU provides 
that ‘[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member 
States’. However, in the case of mixed agreements (which the EU Treaties do not foresee, as such),57 this 
straightforward and simple rule is  
 
52 Merijn Chamon, Implied exclusive powers in the CJEU’s post-Lisbon jurisprudence: The continued 
development of the ERTA doctrine (2018) Common Market Law Review 1101, 1101-1142. 
53 Joined Cases C-626/15 & C-659/16 AMP Antarctique EU:C:2018:362. 
54 Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, UNTS Vol. 1329, I-22301. 
55 Merijn Chamon, ‘Verplicht gemengd optreden van de Unie en de lidstaten binnen de Canberra Conventie 
ondanks het bestaan van een gedeelde bevoegdheid’ (2019) 67(5) Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht 
250, 250-258. 
56 Case 181/73 Haegeman EU:C:1974:41, para. 5. 
57 The only recognition of mixity in the EU Treaties is the requirement of both the ratification by the EU and the 
Member States of the agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR in Article 218(8) TFEU. 
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complicated. After all, the fact that an agreement is concluded as a mixed agreement implies, by 
definition, that for some provisions of the agreement, the EU does not commit itself and its Member 
States, those provisions not being an integral part of EU law.58 Under those provisions, the Member 
States are, nonetheless, bound, not as Member States of the EU, but as independent subjects of 
international law. Concretely, this means that in relation to the provisions by which the EU is bound, an 
obligation under EU law is also created for the Member States.59 Only for those commitments entered 
into as independent subjects of international law are the Member States not bound under EU law. The 
concrete result of this is that the enforcement mechanisms which exist under EU law, and which are 
much more effective than those under international law, cannot be relied upon for those latter 
commitments. Thus, the Commission would not be able to bring proceedings under Article 258 TFEU 
against Member States that fail to respect those provisions and neither would the Court of Justice be 
competent to interpret those provisions, even if they form part of an agreement concluded by the EU. 
While this is straightforward in itself, the situation becomes problematic since, as was noted above, it is 
not made entirely clear in the declaration of competences for which specific provisions the EU or the 
Member States exercise competence. Doing so would undermine one of the advantages of ‘mixity’, i.e. 
the fact that it allows the precise delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member States 
to be left in abeyance.60 One view is that, in a mixed agreement, the EU will only commit itself (and its 
Member States) with regard to the provisions that fall within exclusive EU competence.61 This is in line 
with the traditional Member State view that the EU can only conclude an agreement on its own if the 
whole agreement comes under EU exclusive competence. However, as noted above, the assumption that 
the EU cannot act independently pursuant to shared competences is legally ill-conceived, as recently 
confirmed by the Court.62 It is also contradicted by the Member States’ own practice in the Council.63 
Determining which provisions of a mixed agreement the EU has committed itself to is, therefore, even 
less straightforward than determining the provisions for which the EU is exclusively competent (which 
itself is already problematic).  
 
58 See Erich Vranes, 'Gemischte Abkommen und die Zuständigkeit des EuGH – Grundfragen und neuere 
Entwicklungen in den Außenbeziehungen’ (2009) Europarecht 57, 57-71; Joni Heliskoski, Mixed agreements as 
a technique for organizing the international relations of the European Community and its Member States (Kluwer 
Law International 2001), 62. 
59 Case 104/81 Kupferberg EU:C:1982:362, para. 13; Case C-459/03 Commission/Ireland EU:C:2006:345, para. 
85. 
60 Guillaume Van der Loo and Ramses Wessel, ‘The Non-Ratification of Mixed Agreements: Legal Consequences 
and Solutions’ (2017) Common Market Law Review 735, pp. 752-758. 
61 As noted by Marise Cremona, ‘Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance’, 
in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 125, p. 147. 
62 Case C-600/14 Germany/Council EU:C:2017:935. 
63 For instance, association agreements (foreseen in Article 217 TFEU) are typically concluded as mixed 
agreements, but the association agreement with Kosovo was concluded by the EU on its own. Even if the Council 
Decision notes that this does not set a precedent, it is clear that all Member States in the Council assume that it is 
legally possible for the EU to conclude a broad and comprehensive agreement alone, such as an association 
agreement. See recital 5 of the preamble to Council Decision 2016/342 [2016] OJ L71/1. 
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i. Determining the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to mixed agreements 
Yet, the Court appears to take a lenient approach in terms of its jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of 
mixed agreements. As will be discussed further below, the Court takes into account the Union interest64 when 
it first determines whether the EU enjoys competence and, subsequently, whether it has elected to exercise 
that competence.  
In relation to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which was 
concluded as a mixed agreement as a result of Opinion 1/94,65 the Court noted, in Hermès, that the EU and 
the Member States had not adopted a declaration of competence, i.e. they had not clarified the ‘allocation 
between them of their respective obligations towards the other contracting parties’.66 This meant that it was 
left to the CJEU to determine the matter of the sharing of competences between the EU and the Member 
States, since this question requires a uniform answer that only the Court is capable of giving.67 The test which 
the Court subsequently uses to determine whether it is up to itself or, instead, to the national courts to interpret 
a specific provision of a mixed agreement ties in with the question as to whether the EU has already exercised 
its competence internally. If this is not the case, EU Member States will be deemed to have retained their 
competence and the provision in the TRIPS agreement will be deemed not to come within the scope of EU 
authority.68 In Hermès, the Court noted that the EU had already exercised its competence and, therefore, there 
was an EU interest in answering the preliminary question referred to it by the Dutch judge, even if the specific 
dispute at issue was not covered by EU law itself.69   
Hermès, and the other cases in relation to TRIPS, all reached the Court following a preliminary reference 
under the current Article 267 TFEU, but another avenue that is open to the Court is the infringement 
procedure contained in Article 258 TFEU. The first infringement case in relation to a mixed agreement was 
Commission v Ireland, whereby Ireland had failed to adhere to the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, as prescribed by the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) (which 
was the mixed agreement in casu).70 The Court in that case again suggested that the test to determine its 
jurisdiction depended on whether there is an EU interest to ensure that the commitment is honoured.71 The 
Court tied this question to the EU having previously exercised its competences and found that ‘the subject-
matter of the Berne Convention, is to a very great extent governed by [EU]  
 
64 The concept of Union interest may, of course, be used quite flexibly. While Cremona argues that it should be 
tied to the question of whether specific EU law (either primary or secondary) exists, she recognizes that one could 
also argue that it is in the Union interest for the Court to interpret provisions of a mixed agreement from the 
moment they come under the EU’s competences (regardless of whether they have already been exercised or not). 
See Cremona, supra n 61, 152-154. 
65 Opinion 1/94 on the WTO Agreements EU:C:1994:384. 
66 Case C-53/96 Hermès EU:C:1998:292, para. 24. 
67 Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior, EU:C:2000:688, para. 38; Case C-431/05 Merck 
Genéricos EU:C:2007:496, para. 37. 
68 Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior EU:C:2000:688, para. 48 ; Case C-431/05 Merck 
Genéricos EU:C:2007:496, paras. 34-35. 
69 Case C-53/96 Hermès ECLI:EU:C:1998:292, para. 32. 
70 Case C-13/00 Commission/ Ireland EU:C:2002:184. 
71 Ibid. para. 19. 
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legislation’.72 Despite objections from the UK, which intervened in the proceedings, the Court then confirmed 
its jurisdiction to rule on Ireland’s responsibility in relation to the relevant provision of the mixed EEA 
agreement.Similarly, in Commission v France, the Commission claimed that France had taken insufficient 
action to comply with the requirements imposed by the Protocol to the Barcelona Convention (a mixed 
agreement) for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution from land-based sources.73 While 
the specific infringement committed by France (the discharge of fresh water and alluvia into a saltwater 
marsh) was not covered by EU legislation, the Court found that it had jurisdiction: ‘Since the Convention 
and the Protocol […] create rights and obligations in a field covered in large measure by [EU] legislation, 
there is a[n] [EU] interest’74 in ensuring Member States’ compliance with the obligations imposed by the 
mixed agreement. The reasoning elaborated by the Court in Commission v France, invoking the notion of a 
‘field covered in large measure’, might suggest that the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 258 and 267 
TFEU, respectively, is not perfectly mirrored. However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, in 
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, the Court subsequently also referred to this test in a preliminary ruling 
procedure.75 In his Opinion in Mox Plant, AG Poiares Maduro argued that the threshold for the CJEU to 
accept jurisdiction could be further lowered, suggesting that the Commission could even bring infringement 
proceedings against a Member State for violations of those provisions of a mixed agreement falling outside 
EU competence, if such violations would also jeopardize the attainment of the EU’s objectives (given that 
the agreement is a mixed one).76 This proposition remains to be tested by the Court of Justice itself. 
ii. The relevance of Declaration of Competence for the Court’s jurisdiction 
It is important to note that the above case law starts from the premise that the EU parties have not clarified 
the allocation of competences between themselves. In the TRIPS cases, as in Commission v Ireland and 
Commission v France, there was no declaration of competence which the Court could rely upon in its 
assessment. Would the same reasoning hold in those cases where there is a declaration explicitly specifying 
that the EU has only exercised competence in so far as there is relevant EU legislation, as is the case for the 
CRPD? 
When the EU and the Member States have given an indication of the delimitation of competences through a 
declaration of competences, the Court has confirmed, in the Mox Plant case, that such a declaration is also 
relevant for internal purposes. It can therefore be relied upon to determine whether within the EU legal order 
Member States are under an EU law obligation to respect a provision of a mixed agreement (regardless of 
their international responsibility).77 In Mox Plant, Ireland argued that the EU had only exercised competence 
in relation to  
 
72 Ibid. para. 17. 
73 Case C-239/03 Commission/ France EU:C:2004:598. 
74Ibid. para. 29. 
75 Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie EU:C:2011:125, para. 36. 
76 See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-459/03 Commission/ Ireland EU:C:2006:42, para. 33 at footnote 
37. As the AG notes: in such a case, the EU obligation infringed would not be the provision of the agreement but 
a Member State’s duty of loyal cooperation under Article 4 TEU. 
77 Case C-459/03 Commission/ Ireland EU:C:2006:345, paras 104-111. 
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UNCLOS in so far as the EU enjoyed exclusive competence pursuant to the ERTA doctrine.78 The Court 
noted, however, that the declaration of competences provided that ‘[w]hen [EU] rules exist but are not 
affected, in particular in cases of [EU] provisions establishing only minimum standards, the Member 
States have competence, without prejudice to the competence of the [EU] to act in this field.’79 It relied 
on this to hold that the EU had exercised competence for those UNCLOS provisions where common EU 
rules had been adopted, regardless whether an ERTA effect could be shown.80 Of course, as the Court 
itself implies in Mox Plant, this outcome cannot be generalized for all multilateral mixed agreements 
since it depends on the precise wording of the declaration of competence.81 However, an identical 
provision also features in the declaration of competence which the EU has made pursuant to Article 44 
CRPD.82 Even if the Court’s reasoning in Mox Plant may be criticized,83 it would follow from that case 
that it may be assumed that, under the CRPD, the EU has committed itself (and its Member States) when 
common rules have been adopted by the EU (regardless of whether those rules are ‘affected’ in the sense 
of ERTA and, thus, give rise to an exclusive EU competence). 
In Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, the Court had to decide whether it had competence to interpret Article 
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which is a mixed agreement. That provision prescribes that members of 
the public should have access to administrative or judicial proceedings in environmental cases. The 
NGO Lesoochranárske zoskupenie wanted to be involved in national administrative proceedings related 
to the granting of licenses to hunt, inter alia, brown bears in Slovakia.  The EU’s declaration of 
competence for the Aarhus Convention provided that the internal EU legal instruments in force did not 
fully cover the commitment under Article 9(3) of the Convention in so far as decisions by national 
authorities are challenged. Unless the EU would adopt further measures, the declaration provided that 
the Member States remained competent in this area.84 The EU had, in fact, adopted the Aarhus 
Regulation,85 which regulates proceedings at EU level but does not harmonise proceedings at national 
level. The Advocate General (AG) concluded that the CJEU therefore had no competence to interpret 
Article 9(3) of the Convention, since the EU had not exercised its competence in relation to  
 
78 Case C-459/03 Commission/ Ireland EU:C:2006:345, para. 100 citing United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, UNTS Vol. 1833, I-31363 
79 Ibid. para. 104. 
80 Under the ERTA doctrine, the existence of common rules is not sufficient for the EU to enjoy exclusive 
competence, since those common rules also need to be affected by the (provisions of the) international agreement. 
81 Case C-459/03 Commission/Ireland EU:C:2006:345, para. 108. 
82 See Annex II to Council Decision 2010/48 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2010] OJ L23/35. 
83 As Cremona rightly notes, there was no real evidence of the extent to which the EU had exercised its shared 
competence. The Council Decision was indeed based on the EU’s environmental competence (a shared 
competence), but this does not tell us anything about the extent to which that competence was exercised. The 
declaration of competence on which the Court relied was, in fact, interpretable in multiple ways. See Marise 
Cremona, supra n 61, 150-151. 
84 See the declaration of competence annexed to Council Decision 2005/370 [2005] OJ L124/1. 
85 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, UNTS Vol. 2161, I-37770 
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this issue.86 The Court, however, controversially87 found that Article 9(3) did come within the scope of 
EU law, since the EU had adopted the Habitats Directive88 which lists the brown bear in one of its 
annexes. In line with Commission v France,89 the Court thus held that the issue was covered ‘to a large 
extent’ by EU law.90 In addition, the Court applied a Hermès reasoning, noting that Article 9(3) of the 
Convention could apply to both proceedings at EU and national level, thus warranting a uniform 
interpretation by the Court.91 
V. THE CRPD AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF EU LAW BINDING ON THE MEMBER STATES 
It follows from the previous section that those provisions of the CRPD for which the EU has exercised 
competence form an integral part of EU law in the sense of Haegeman, meaning they are binding on 
both EU institutions and Member States and fall under the jurisdiction of the CJEU.  
In a number of cases, the Court has also been invited to interpret the CPRD, to determine the obligations 
which it imposes on EU Member States. Procedurally, such cases may typically be brought before the 
Court in two ways: indirectly, through preliminary references by national judges, and, directly, when 
the Commission brings infringement actions against the Member States for failure to comply with EU 
law. Procedurally, and as follows from the above, before the Court can answer such questions, it needs 
to ascertain whether the EU has committed itself (and its Member States) in relation to the CPRD 
provisions invoked.  
i. Preliminary References related to the CRPD 
Thus, in HK Danmark, the first case before the Court of Justice in which the CPRD featured, the Court 
referred to its general jurisprudence on the hierarchy between international agreements concluded by 
the EU and the EU’s ordinary secondary legislation,92 and noted that the EU’s declaration of competence 
refers explicitly to the Employment Equality Directive as one of the internal  
 
86 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie EU:C:2010:436, paras. 75-80. 
87 The Court’s decision was criticized by several authors, see, inter alia, Laurent Coutron, ‘Chronique Droit du 
contentieux de l'Union européenne - Sur une apparente lapalissade : les associations de protection de 
l'environnement doivent pouvoir ... protéger l'environnement’ [2011] Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 819-
825; Marcus Klamert, ‘Dark matter: competence, jurisdiction and "the area largely covered by EU law - comment 
on Lesoochranarske’ (2012) European Law Review 340, 340-350. For a more congenial comment on the Court’s 
finding, see Catherine Flaesch-Mougin, ‘Chronique Action extérieure de l'Union européenne - Union européenne 
et système institutionnel de l'action extérieure’ (2011) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 662-665. 
88 Council Directive (EEC) 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ 
L206/7. 
89 Case C‑239/03 Commission/ France EU:C:2004:598. 
90 Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie EU:C:2011:125, paras 36-38 
91 Ibid. paras 42-43. 
92 Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HK Danmark EU:C:2013:222, para. 28. 
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measures which fall within the remit of the CRPD’s obligations.93 Substantively, as will be further 
discussed in Part II of this Handbook,94 this resulted in the Court adapting the EU definition of 
‘disability’, which the Court itself had given earlier in Chacón Navas,95  so as to be in line with the 
conceptualization of disability provided in recital (e) of the CPRD’s preamble.96  
The Z and in HK Danmark cases are illustrations of how, because of the hierarchy of norms, the EU is 
required to follow the CPRD’s definition of ‘disability’ in so far as possible.97 The limit ‘in so far as 
possible’ means that provisions of internal EU law cannot be interpreted contra legem. If an internal 
provision cannot be interpreted or applied in a way that is compatible with the international provision, 
the internal provision may be set aside but only in so far as the provision in the international agreement 
has direct effect.98 The problematic nature of the ‘in so far as possible’ requirement is further illustrated 
in the Z and Glatzel cases.99 In Z, the Court found that the Employment Equality Directive, unlike the 
CPRD, does not generally target discrimination on the ground of disability and that it does so only in so 
far as it results in compromising an individual’s participation in his or her professional life.100 Given the 
objective of the Employment Equality Directive, the general definition of disability in the CPRD could 
not be relied upon to broaden the scope of the Directive beyond discrimination with regard to 
employment and occupation.101 In Glatzel, the ‘in so far as possible’ requirement was a stumbling block 
because the EU provision was unequivocal. As the CJEU stated:  
Point 6.4 of Annex III to Directive 2006/126 provides unequivocally that drivers of motor 
vehicles in categories C1 and C1E must have minimum visual acuity of 0,1 for the worse eye. 
In those circumstances, it does not appear possible to give that provision of secondary law an 
interpretation which would enable it to circumvent the clear rule laying down that minimum 
value.102 
 
 
93 Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-ment and 
occupation (Employment Equality Directive) [2000] OJ L303/16 
94 See infra Broderick and Watson, Disability in EU Non-Discrimination Law, in this volume. 
95 Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas EU:C:2006:456, para. 43. 
96 See Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HK Danmark EU:C:2013:222, para. 38. 
97 Case C-363/12 Z EU:C:2014:159, para. 74; Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HK Danmark EU:C:2013:222, 
para. 31. 
98 AG Jääskinen recently suggested to the Court to decouple the issue of the invocability of a provision of an 
international agreement to review the legality of EU acts from the question of that provision’s direct effect, but the 
Court maintained its traditional case law. See Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Joined Cases C-401/12 P to C-403/12 
P Council e.a/ Vereniging Milieudefensie EU:C:2014:310, paras 58-84. 
99 Case C-356/12 Glatzel EU:C:2014:350, para. 71. 
100 See Case C-363/12 Z EU:C:2014:159, para. 80; Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-363/12 Z EU:C:2013:604, para. 
90. 
101 Indeed, in light of the principle of conferred powers, the EU arguably lacks competence to generally prohibit 
discrimination on the ground of disability. 
102 Case C-356/12 Glatzel EU:C:2014:350, para. 74. 
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In both Z and Glatzel, the Court then ascertained whether the validity of the Employment Equality 
Directive and Directive 2006/126,103 respectively, could be reviewed in light of the CPRD but held that 
this was impossible in those cases. Given the programmatic nature of the CPRD’s provisions, they were 
not worded in a sufficiently precise and unconditional manner to have direct effect.104 The Court 
therefore did not have to address the question as to whether the CPRD’s nature allows for direct effect.105 
With regard to the Z case, however, it could be questioned whether it was at all possible to assess the 
validity of the Employment Equality Directive in light of the CRPD. According to the declaration of 
competences, the CRPD is only binding on the EU in so far as it has exercised its competence by 
adopting common rules. In so far as the scope of the Directive only covers discrimination on the ground 
of disability in employment and occupation, and no other relevant common EU rules exist, the EU would 
not be bound by Articles 5, 6, 27(1)(b) and 28(2)(b) of the CPRD, and, instead, the Member States alone 
have assumed responsibility for these commitments.106 As a result, it would not be possible to assess the 
legality of EU secondary legislation in light of these provisions unless they codify customary rules of 
general international law,107 which arguably was not the case in Z. 
A final decision illustrating the complex manner in which the CRPD (as a mixed agreement) interacts 
with EU law and has effects vis-à-vis private parties is Milkova, where the unequal treatment of disabled 
private employees and disabled civil servants was at issue. Again, the Court (and the AG) noted that the 
issue did not come under the scope of the Employment Equality Directive, because the Directive only 
prohibits discrimination on the ground of disability, whereas the problem at issue related to 
discrimination on the ground of an individual being employed as a civil servant rather than under a 
private employment contract. For the AG, this was the end of the story, since the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination are exhaustively listed in the Directive,108 and as a result the dispute did not even come 
within the scope of the Directive.109 In contrast, the Court took a different approach based on Article 
7(2) of the Directive, which allows for positive action and provides that ‘the principle of equal treatment 
shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to maintain or adopt […] facilities for 
safeguarding or promoting [disabled persons’] integration into the working environment’. The AG read 
this provision as confirming the sovereignty of Member States to adopt positive  
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action, such measures falling outside the scope of EU law.110 The Court, however, noted that Article 7(2) of 
the Directive also had to be read in light of the CPRD, which allows for positive action and, which lays down 
a right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.111 The Court then found that, if Member States pursue 
positive action (as permitted under Article 7(2) of the Directive), they still have to respect the principle of 
equal treatment. While ultimately leaving the assessment to the national judge, the Court noted that ‘the 
distinction made by [the national] legislation between employees with a particular disability and civil servants 
with the same disability does not appear to be sufficient in the light of the aim pursued by that legislation’.112 
ii. Infringement Proceedings Based on the CRPD 
To date, the Commission has not brought any infringement proceedings against a Member State for failure 
to implement or respect a provision of the CRPD. However, a case was brought against Italy for failure to 
implement Article 5 of the Employment Equality Directive, which lays down the obligation for employers to 
provide reasonable accommodation. Although the Court indeed read the notions of ‘disability’ and 
‘reasonable accommodation’ in light of the CRPD, the Convention did not play a key role in the case, since 
what was in dispute was whether the lack of a clear and explicit obligation for all employers to provide 
reasonable accommodation amounted to an infringement of Article 5 of the Directive.113 
Interestingly, following the amendment of the Italian law in question, in order to comply with the Court’s 
ruling, Member of Parliament (MEP) Forenza queried the Commission on whether it believed that the 
amendment, allowing prospective employers greater discretion in choosing which disabled persons they 
would employ, was in line with Articles 26 and 27 of the CRPD.114  In its reply, the Commission defended 
the view that the Italian law did not violate the EU Directive or the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(CFR) and noted, equally, that it does ‘not have the competence to assess whether there is a violation of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’. This seems to be an erroneous statement, since 
the Commission does have such competence in so far as the matter at hand relates to an issue on which the 
EU has legislated or on an issue which is largely covered by EU rules (or if the standard would be further 
lowered as per the suggestion of AG Poiares Maduro, where there is a Union interest, pursuant to the duty of 
loyal cooperation, in assuring that the Member States honour the commitment in question).  
Indeed, even without the Court’s clarification in Milkova, Article 5 of the Employment Equality Directive on 
reasonable accommodation needs to be interpreted in line with Article 26 and 27 of the CRPD which further 
set out what reasonable accommodation in accessing employment should mean. This would  
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allow the Commission (and the Court) the opportunity to exercise greater scrutiny over the Member 
States’ policies on reasonable accommodation in infringement proceedings. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In general, and from an EU law perspective, mixed agreements are viewed sceptically, at least in so far 
as they are facultative mixed agreements. With regard to such agreements, the formal involvement of 
the Member States creates a plethora of legal and practical challenges, without much evident added 
value. In the case of the CRPD, however, its mixed nature appears to be obligatory, because the CRPD 
touches on issues that come under the Member States’ reserved competences. Indeed, the mixed nature 
of the Convention is reflected in the broad scope and objectives of the CRPD. Having said this, the 
CRPD’s mixity is a double-edged sword, since it undoubtedly results in a legally more complex situation 
but at the same time, the Convention being mixed means that the possibilities for effective enforcement 
of the CRPD by private parties vis-à-vis EU Member States are enhanced (compared to the situation 
where only the Member States would be parties to the CRPD). In this regard, it should also be noted 
that the CRPD’s mixity is not a factor in the EU’s inability to accede to the OP-CRPD; instead, this is 
the result of the applicable voting threshold in the Council (i.e. unanimity), which is difficult to reach.   
Still, before EU mechanisms may be relied upon to ensure the enforcement of specific provisions of the 
CRPD vis-à-vis the Member States it must first be determined whether the EU has in fact committed 
itself in relation to those provisions. When the provisions come under the EU’s exclusive competence, 
this issue is in principle clear since only the EU will have the competence to undertake commitments. 
This question is complicated however since the Court’s test for supervening exclusivity has evolved in 
recent case law and is difficult to predict. For shared competences the question is even more problematic 
since the Court’s test here is whether the issue regulated by the international agreement is covered in 
large measure by EU legislation (France v Commission) unless a declaration of competences exists for 
the mixed agreement. For the CRPD this is the case and the declaration of competences is worded 
similarly to that for the UNCLOS (interpreted by the Court in Mox Plant), suggesting that EU 
mechanisms of enforcement are available for those provisions of the CRPD on which there is relevant 
EU legislation, regardless whether that legislation is affected in the AETR sense. The threshold for 
having recourse to the EU’s powerful enforcement mechanisms (the preliminary ruling and infringement 
procedures) thus seems rather low. While the Court has already developed some jurisprudence in 
relation to the CRPD through the preliminary ruling procedure, no infringement procedures have been 
brought yet in relation to the CRPD. For the latter to be the case, a more bold and ambitious approach 
of the Commission seems both required and indeed legally feasible. 
